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Abstracts: The aim of this paper is to examine whether governance causes poverty or alternatively 
poverty reduction causes governance in Nigeria. We applied ARDL approach to co integration in order 
to establish the direction of the relationship between governance and poverty reduction in Nigeria. The 
result suggests that three out of six indicators of governance integrate with poverty, but all of the 
indicators took a negative sign. Suggesting that the indicators of governance are too coarse to capture 
the nuances of interaction between governance and poverty in Nigeria, results from the Error 
correction representation suggest that there is reverse causality, Our study have some implication for 
economic research and for economic policy, research on governance must focus on real issues that 
involves actual rules, rather than on conceptually vague assessment of governance scores. On the 
policy, this paper suggests that Nigeria needs to focus on critical growth driven policies that sustained 
growth and poverty reduction in the short and medium term. 
 
Key worsd: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A fast-growing comparative literature on research on goo- governance approach to development stresses 
good- governance widely, defined as the traditional and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in 
a country (Kaufmann, et al., 2000) is important for economic development. This understanding surface from the 
earlier pioneering work of institutional economists such as Dauglass North and Mancur Olson, which led to the 
wide spreads different types of cross-sectional empirical evidences suggesting a positive relationship between 
governance structures and economic growth. No wonder, in recent development a lot of agreement have been 
reached among growth economists, development specialists and international policy- makers that “good 
governance” is basic and necessary for economic growth and poverty reduction (Kaufmann et al., 2003). 
Despite comparative literature on governance structures and social determinants of economic growth and 
poverty, the governance matters to development have been marred with number of short comings. Cross-
sectional studies proven that good governance matter for economic growth have been challenge on the grounds 
of reverse causality problems (Chod and Calderon 2000). Attempt to addressed causality problems has been 
marred with measurement error (Knacks and Keefer, (2003), missing variables Gleaser et al., (2004), conceptual 
vagueness (La Porta et al., (2004). The weakness of these types of cross-sectional regression exercise pointed 
out by Quibria (2006) in his now famous paper “Does Governance matter? Yes, No or may be some evidence 
from Developing Asia. The main reason why cross-sectional studies fail to capture the nuances of interactions 
between governance and economic growth is because the model was developed based on the implicit 
governance model which exist only in institutions available in Western richer countries.  
In the case of Nigeria, the causality of the various links and channels of influence between governance, 
growth and poverty is not well understood. Despite deficit in its governance performance, Nigerian economic 
growth, is rising with poor governance performance and rising growth, is also associated with rising poverty. 
Recent data has indicated economic growth rising to the average of 7% since, 2006, which is higher than the 
6.5% target rate for appreciable poverty reduction within Sub Saharan Africa (MDG, 2010).  
This apparent paradox of rising growth with poor governance performance and rising growth with rising 
poverty, contradict the theoretical as well as empirical evidences suggesting that the causal relationship between 
governance, economic growth and poverty reduction is a one way causation running from governance to growth 
and poverty reduction and that causation from growth to governance is weak or negative, attempt to resolve 
these controversies is yet settled. The objective of this paper to determine whether Good governance causes 
poverty reduction or alternatively poverty reduction causes good-governance. 
Following the introduction the remaining part of the paper is structured as follows, section two provide 
methodology of the paper, while section three present the results and finally section four provide discussion and 
policy recommendation and conclusion. 
 
Methodology: 
We revisit six measures of governance used in the current economic literature, in an attempt to examine 
each, one empirical validity, we follow the common practice in the literature, by following the work of Gleaser 
et al (2004), and Quibria, (2006), in order to check the validity of the empirical evidences established through 
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the use of these measure of governance indicators. Even though most of these indicators are quite 
heterogeneous, some reflecting process, while others seek to capture performance, but yet these are the 
indicators used to show governance cause growth and poverty reduction. 
We consider four such measures motivated by the work of Alberto Alesina (1998), Bureaucratic efficiency, 
and absence of corruption and the Bureaucratic quality and rule law. We are motivated because Alesina used 
these indicators to established the fact that governance cause growth, and he presented his work at the 1997 
Annual World Bank conference on Development Economic, On the basis of this piece work World Bank and 
other international donor agencies imposed aid conditionality’s to poor countries stressing, they must have 
quality of institution before they can qualify for foreign assistance. Despite serious modeling problems of short 
time frame for Alesina study, and the unwarranted normative inference using perception based indexes, to 
conclude on the causal relationship between governance and growth, we placed this argument in country 
specific situation and assess the validity of these empirical evidences under a case study approach to Nigeria. 
We applied autoregressive distributed approach to co -integration recently developed by Peseran et al, 
(2001), which is a breakthrough in the area of modeling time series data, and the most simples’ way of 
establishing the long run relationship among economic variables under investigation. Why we decided to adopt 
ARDL approach in this study, is because this approach enables us to investigate the long run relationship 
between governance, economic growth and poverty reduction in Nigeria. Considering the small sample size of 
our data ARDL model will enable us to overcome small sample size problems in co- integration analysis.  
 
Model Specification: 
We consider the practice in the literature following the work of Abdul Jalil and Yig Ma (2008), we modify 
and specified the model below: 
∆InPO= β0+
m
j i 
 β1∆InPO t-1 + n
j i
 β2∆ECt-1+ n
j i
 β3∆QBt-1+ n
j i
 β4∆SCt-1+ n
j i
 β5∆CPt-1+ n
j i

β6∆RLt-1+ 
n
j i
 β7∆CCt-1+ n
j i
 β8∆InEQt-1+  n
j i
 β9∆InGDPt-1+ β10InPOt-I + β11ECt-1+β12QBt-
1+β13SCt-1+β14CPt-+β15RLt-1+β16CC+β117InEQt-1+β18InGDPt-1+et       (1) 
 
The null hypothesis of no long run relationship is examined through F-test of the joint significant of the 
lagged level coefficient of equation (1). 
Ho: β10, β11, β12, β13, β14, β15, β16, β17, β18, =0 against the alternative hypothesis 
Hi: β100, β110, β120, β130, β140, β150, β160, β17,0, β180 
However for the error correction representation the equation is estimated as follow: 
∆InPO= β0+
m
j i 
 β1∆InPO t-1 + n
j i
 β2∆ECt-1+ n
j i
 β3∆QBt-1+ n
j i
 β4∆SCt-1+ n
j i
 β5∆CPt-1+ n
j i

β6∆RLt-1+ 
n
j i
 β7∆CCt-1+ n
j i
 β8∆InEQt-1+  n
j i
 β9∆InGDPt-1+∂ECMt-1+Ut 
 
Where InPO is the proxy of poverty taking in logarithm form, and is the dependent variables. While InEC, 
InQB, InSC, InCP, InRL, InCC, InEQ, InGDP are the proxies of Accountable executive, Quality of the 
bureaucracy, strong civic society, rule of law, competitiveness of political participation and control of corruption 
respectively and InEQ, InGDP is the proxies of inequality of income and economic growth, they represent the 
explanatory variables in the model and et, is the white noise term. 
 
Sources of Data: 
Data on relative poverty or head count poverty ratio proxy as InPO, which measure the percentage of the 
population below the poverty line, was collected from various issues of the Poverty Assessments Survey data 
from the National Bureau of Statistic of Nigeria, ranging from National expenditure survey of 1980-1996, 
Nigerian living standard surveys of 2003/2004 and Harmonized Nigerian living standard survey (HNLSS, 
2009/2010). Data on GDP per capita Proxy as InGDP were collected from World Bank Development indicators, 
and Central Bank of Nigeria annual statement of accounts various issues. Similarly Data on inequality of 
Income were obtained from the various National Poverty Assessments Survey, various issues and Daninger 
square assembled data set on inequality of income for Nigeria. 
Measurement of the indicators of governance is not an easy task considering the abstracts nature of the 
concepts, this made a large amount of these indicators in principle multi dimensional. Considering this multi 
dimensionality of these indicators, we follow the work of (Knack and Keefer 1997, Mauro 1995, to use different 
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measures for each dimension of the indicators. We have no option other than to utilize the existing set of data 
that was made available since our aim is to check the validity of the empirical evidences coming out from this 
data set 
For the purpose of this study, we follow the work of Compos, N.F. and Nugent, J.F (1999) and collected 
data from different various sources due to recent development in which data on these indicators are made 
available. We specifically collected data from World Wide Governance indicators, Country Risk Guide ICRG 
data house, Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), Polity 11 data house, Freedom house data set, 
World Bank CPIA assemble data set.  We start with Accountability of the Executive; we collect data from the 
Gurrs Polity 111 data set. To measure the quality of Bureaucracy which is the second indicator of governance, 
in our model, we collected data from ICRG data house and data from BERI data house. The rule law, which is 
another variable in our model, data was collected from ICRG indicators. Data on Strong Civil liberties were 
found from the Gastil (now called freedom house indicators data set. Data on Competitive Political 
Participation, where sources from Gurrs Polity 111 data set, data on the absence of corruption where also made 
available from the private international investment risk services and World Bank CPIA data set.  
 
Presentation of the Results: 
 
Table 01 Characteristics of the Sample Data 
 
 
InGDP EC QB SC CP RL CC InEQ InPO 
Mean 7.102177 128227.9 -1.167187 -1.010313 -.971875 -1.106250 -1.049688 1.360313 -0.687143 
Median 7.099951 -1.000000 -1.000000 -1.000000 -1.000000 -1.000000 -1.000000 1.385385 -0.846298 
Maximum 21.43372 4103322 1.690000 -0.880000 -0.690000 -1.000000 -0.810000 1.443172 3.835142 
Minimum 5.394634 -1.670000 -2.080000 -1.220000 -1.320000 -1.159166 -1.320000 1.194897 -0.865122 
Std.Dev. 2.750778 725371.9 0.658225 0.067417 0.140814 0.159166 0.106513 0.076356 0.825870 
Skewness 4.574841 5.388159 2.321897 -1.390796 -0.102381 -1.328567 -0.986122 -1.084341 5.374711 
Kurtosis 24.56973 30.03226 12.28102 5.611519 3.568499 3.542040 4.192313 3.345754 29.93843 
          
Jargue-Bera 731.9600 1129.163 143.6029 19.40972 0.486825 9.805551 6.229351 6.229351 1121.639 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000061 0.783948 0.007426 0.044393 0.044393 0.000000 
          
Sum   227.2697 4103293 -37.35000 -32.33000 -31.10000 -35.40000 42.16970 42.16970 -21.98859 
Sum sq. 
Dev. 
234.5701 1.63E+13 13.43105 0.140897 0.614688 0.785350 0.174906 0.174906 21.14392 
          
 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Note: The optimal lags for conducting ADF test were determine by AIC (Akaike information criteria) * indicate significant at 1% level ** 
indicate significant at 5% level and *** indicate significant at 10%. 
 
Table 1: Unit Root Test Result 
Variabl
es 
ADF 
Statistics 
Critical 
values 
ADF Stat Critical 
value 
PP statistics Critical 
value 
PP statistic  Critical 
value  
 Level Level First dif. First dif. at level at level First dif. First dif. 
InGDP -5.825754 -3.661661 -6.691555 -2.967767 -5.841001 -2.960411 -32.24068 -2.963972 
EC -5.567765 -2.960411 -9.165151 -3.670170 -5.568385 -2.960411 -29.38116 -2.963972 
QB -3.986312 -2.960411 -6.758683 -2.967767 -3.959514 -2.960411 -19.54798 -2.96972 
SC -4.658259 -2.981038 -6.941956 -2.963972 -2.997492 -2.960411 -7.465050 -2.963972 
CP -2.326900 -2.960411 -7909285 -2.963972 -2.165423 -2.960411 -8.100635 -2.963972 
RL -2.670714 -2.960411 -8.316247 -2.963972 -2.639485 -2.960411 -14.70577 -2.963972 
CC -4.027230 -2.960411 -9.652022 -2.963972- -4.027230 -2.960411 -18.21547 -2.963972 
InEQ -2.084581 -2.967767 -5.313154 -2.976263 -2.094432 -2.967767 -5.313711 -2.976263 
 
Evidence from the results in table 4.1.2 using Dickey fuller test, all series are found to be stationary at level, 
with the exception of RP and InEQ which were non stationary at level, to make all series stationary we move to 
test unit root at first differencing, in table 4.1.2, the results indicates that after differencing all the series are 
stationary at 5% level of significance, implies that the computed Mackinnon statistics is greater in absolute term 
than the calculated critical values. 
 
Table 2: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates 
Test statistics  Significance level Bound testing critical value with no trend 
F- Statistics   1(0) 1(1) 
InGDP 11.9212  1% 5.754         6.483 
InPO 23.9399          
InEQ 13.3860 
EC 3.6511 
QB 14.5386 
 5% 
10% 
3.993 
3.247 
4.533 
3.773 
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SC 8.5994 
CP 21.1851 
RL 23.5460 
CC 16.3289 
Note: The critical values are taken from Narayan (2004) 
 
However, from the result obtained in table 2 the computed F statistics for joint significance of all lags 
variables in the model with exception of EC, have exceeded the upper critical value at 
 
Table 3: Long run  coefficient Poverty as a Dependent Variable (InPO) 
Regressors             Coefficient                T-Ratio 
InGDP                     -.6851E-8               --1.8263 
InEQ                        -1575.8                  -5.2003 
EC                            -11.2141                 -1.4701 
 QB                           -35.3394                -3.2518 
SC                             -37.5516                -1.3403 
CP                             -20.0366                -.61743 
RL                            -106.7880               -3.0716 
CC                             9.4507                  5.2598 
Note: ARDL( 1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,1) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
 
Diagnostic test: 
Serial Correlation 2 (1) = 11.6032 
Functional Form 2 (1) = 2.5658 
Normality 2 (1) = 3.7098 
Heteroscedasticty 2 (1) = 0.41224 
The next step is to estimate the long run relationship, between poverty and governance by taking poverty as 
a dependent variable, from the results in table 3, three out of six governance’s measures appear statistically 
significant but take a negative sign, indicating governance move with poverty in a negative way in the long run. 
However, Corruption appear with high magnitude implying that 1 percent changes in corruption will cause 94% 
changes in poverty in Nigeria, this has indicate how structural and endemic corruption is in Nigeria. The 
positive sign in the corruption coefficient is indicating, corruption and poverty move in the same direction in 
Nigeria, high corruption is associated with high poverty. The positive sign can be explain by a particular set of 
common explanation found in the economic theory which argued that corruption, by itself, does not produce 
poverty. Rather, corruption has direct consequences on economic growth factors, intermediaries that in turn 
produce poverty. Thus the relationship is indirect. Corruption affects poverty by first impacting economic 
growth factors, which, in turn impact poverty levels. In other Words, increased corruption reduces economic 
investment, distorts market, hinders competitions; create inefficiency by increasing the costs of doing business 
and increases income. The impact of corruption on these economic factors affect poverty, implying increase 
corruption will lead to increase poverty which proves the positive sign in our results plausibly possible. This has 
been supported by a number of empirical studies. (see e.g Knacks. 2002. Gupta et al, 1998). 
However, inequality of income is statistically significant but having negative sign and a corrupted value of -
1575.8, this may be due to the thinness of the data and the very limited period of time data on distribution is 
made available, under which a particular sign of causality may be tested. All the remaining variables do not 
appear statistically significant with poverty reduction in Nigeria.  
How does one explain these seemingly paradoxical results? With governance indicators had taken a 
negative sign. Does this suggest that governance is unimportant for economic growth and poverty reduction? 
Perhaps that may not be exactly, the better inference would be that the conventional measures of governance are 
too coarse to capture the nuances of governance, growth and poverty reduction interactions in Nigeria. The main 
reason why these governance measures fail to capture the nuances of interactions between governance and 
growth in the long run analysis, is that all these set of data only measure outcomes, not some permanent 
characteristics that North refers to, as such all these measures, rise with Per capita income, and they are highly 
volatile. 
However, to investigate these seemingly paradoxical results, more rigorously, we estimate a parsimonious 
poverty equation through the error correction representation in table 
 
Table 4: Error correction model 
Regress
ors 
Coef InPO InGDP EC Coeff. QB Coeff.SC Coeff.CP 
 
Coeff.RL Coeff.CC 
 
DGDP -.2054E-8 
(1.1854 ) 
  
-.0000 
(-.089070) 
 .0000 
(.024628) 
-.0065890 
(-4.3886) 
.0000 
(.14321) 
-0000 
(.-23613) 
DPO  
 
10.9795 
(4.3195) 
-.020742 
(-4.6719) 
-.035362 
(-4.6645) 
-.5115E-3 
(-.66536) 
-.0065890 
(4.3886) 
-.0070710 
(-5.0692) 
-.0032966 
(-3.2799) 
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DEQ -1503.5 
(-5.4920) 
 -50.5312 
(-5.2816) 
-98.7914 
(-8.6690) 
-2.1918 
(-6.9388) 
-19.9861 
(-11.1947) 
-17.5042 
(-6.3714) 
 
DEC --7.4174 
(-1.619) 
-664.8581 
(-5.9948) 
 -1.1070 
(-6.1523) 
-.020434 
(-.65638) 
-.25203 
(-5.2584) 
-.21719 
(-6.5160) 
 
DQB -11.1659 
(-4.3977) 
-312.3430 
(-3.5152) 
-.44724 
(-5.4065) 
 -.051542 
(-3.4582) 
-.17804 
(-12.8109) 
-.17031 
(-8.4933) 
 
DSC -24.8378 
(-1.4498) 
329.4836 
(4.5228) 
-1.3815 
(-2.9263) 
-3.0362 
(-4.3246) 
-.54949 
(-4.0124) 
-.54949 
(-4.0124) 
-.57840 
(-4.2401) 
 
DCP -36.3609 
(-2.3006) 
129.1064 
(.76597) 
-2.3518 
(-5.2584) 
 
-4.9548 
(-12.4578) 
 
 
-.77079 
(-6.4289) 
-.88004 
(-7.8361) 
 
DRL -70.6329 
(-4.7561) 
302.3322 
(2.1599) 
-1.8059 
(-3.5812) 
-14.5971 
 (-8.4933) 
-.77079 
(-6.4289) 
 
 
   
DCC 23.9472 
(.1.5667) 
-1644.6 
(-5.9572) 
1.1116 
(2.1629) 
3.0689 
(4.0724) 
 
.49007 
(3.2574) 
 .71706 
(6.3438) 
 
ECM(     -.66143 
(-5.2971) 
-15886 
(-3.2882) 
-.51555 
(-4.1019) 
-1.8492 
(-16.2732) 
 
-.17977 
-1.0001 -2.27801 -1.8417 
 
Dependent variable InPO 
Ecm = InPO + .1056E-81InGDP + 2192.8InEQ + 60.163EC +134.4203QB +207.0737SC +241.238CP 
+199.0766RL +134.1189CC 
Dependent variable InGDP 
Ecm= InGDP +.1056E-8EC+ 2192.8QB + 60.1636CP+134.4203SC+ 207.0737RL+241.2338CC 
+199.0766InEQ +134.1189InPO 
 
Diagnostic test: 
R2== .95444 
R- Bar squared .91457 
SR = 3.961.9609 
DW= 2.8834 
 
However, we examine the Dynamic Poverty Error Correction Model, taking poverty as dependent variables. 
We established error correction term ECM which is the residual of the long run equation; if it is negative and 
statistically significant, we said it is affirmative. Thus in the dynamic poverty model ECM is statistically 
significant with a correct sign, having a value of -5.5971 and a coefficient of -0.66143, which has indicated a 
quick adjustment to the stable state of equilibrium. Having a value more than -1 indicate a quick adjustment, 
since -1 indicate one year adjustment, but having a value greater than -1 indicate faster movement of adjustment 
back to equilibrium after some deviations in the short run and all variables move together toward long run 
equilibrium. This has established one way causation from poverty from explanatory regressors to poverty.  
However, we turn to the short run results, in order to find out the direction of the relationship in the short 
run. Thus in the short run the coefficient of the lag dGDP is negative and statistically not significant. The lag 
value of dEQ which stand for inequality of income is negative and statistically significant. But the problem is 
that inequality took a negative sign which make it difficult to interpret.  
While the value of the lag coefficient of dQB which is the quality of bureaucracy is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that the direction of causation goes from quality of government bureaucracy to 
poverty reduction in the short run, the coefficient of the lag value of dSC which is strong civic society is 
significant but take a negative sign. Implying strong civil society affect the level of poverty in the short runs, 
negatively. The coefficient of the competitive political participation is also negative. Indicating that poverty is 
affected by the competitive political participation, in the short run, in a negative way, in other words there is 
unidirectional causality running from competitive political participation to poverty reduction. Poverty reductions 
depend on open and transparent policy decision making process where poor man is given the chance to 
participate and have inputs in decisions making and governance. Poor transparent and poor open policy making 
will lead to increase in poverty. 
However, surprisingly the coefficient of the lag value of rule of law is negative and significant; indicating 
rule of law affects poverty in the short run in a negative way. The coefficient of the lag value of control of 
corruption is negative and not statistically significant, implying corruption does not affect poverty in the short 
run in Nigeria, and there is no causal linkage between corruption and poverty in the short run.  
It is worth reporting that all models pass through diagnostic stability tests, the diagnostic tests of serial 
correlation, functional for specification, normality and hetroscidasticity. All diagnostic results are presented 
immediately below table 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4,4.6 respectively. 
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Diagnostic Tests: 
A: Serial Correlation 2    (1) =   2.9105[.088]   
B: Functional Form 2 (1) = .013369[.908]                                                                     
C: Normality 2 (1) = 8.0006[.018]                                                                              
D: Heteroscadasticity 2 (1) =   2.1996[.138]  
We fail to reject the null hypothesis of serial correlation, and we also fail to reject Heteroscadasticity test. 
We fail to reject the null hypothesis of functional. We can conclude that our model have passed the diagnostic 
test. 
 
Stability test of Dependent variable Test: 
 
Fig. 1: Poverty 
 
 
Fig. 2: ccountability of Executive 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1: 1 Economic growth 
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Fig. 4.1.: 2 Competitive politic 
 
 
Fig. 3: Rule of law 
 
 
Fig. 4: Inequality of Income 
 
In figures above we test the stability of the dependent variable which is the GDP per capita income and we 
conclude the plot CUSUM has indicate stability of the dependent variables as it falls within the two parallel line 
and does not exceed 5% level of significant and it is within the two parallel line in our plot, they does not 
crossed. 
 
Discussion On The Results: 
We attempt to discuss the results by analyzing the good-governance indicators within the estimated long 
run growth model. Considering the results in table 3 four indicators of governance were significantly integrated 
with growth suggesting that governance causes economic growth. But the apparent negative sign taken by these 
indicators suggest that there is no straight forward answer to the question, because what the negative sign is 
suggesting is that the conventional measures of governance are too coarse to capture the nuances of 
governance’s growth interactions under Nigerian situation. The main possible reasons why these indices appear 
with negative sign are because; as noted among others by Rodrik and Mukand (2005) good economic principles 
do not cheaply translate into unique institutional and governance solution, but rather require to be planted to 
particular economic and social context. This line of argument is also supported by Quibria (2006), that all 
dimension of governance are not necessary important for growth and poverty reduction at all stages of 
development. Other reasons, why the negative sign appear, may possibly because the good governance measures 
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did not explore the important differences in history, geography, or initial condition of a particular country. These 
are important issues neglected in the good governance measures under cross-sectional studies. Other important 
possibilities as pointed out by Gleaser et al (2004), improvement in good-governance scores alone is not 
sufficient for economic growth and poverty reduction, unless supported by similar improvement in human and 
social capital. In the same line of reasoning Knacks (2003), have also acknowledge that the existing governance 
measure does not address specific reforms, because, they are based on a very broad and aggregated indicators of 
institutional performance. As such the indicators are not even measuring the institution parse, but the structure   
individual equilibrium. 
To address the question more squarely, we look at the results of the error correction representation which is 
presented in table 4 However, looking at the results leaves us skeptical about the causality. What the results 
suggested is the existence of reverse causality, which has been the major issue in growth regression. The 
problem is not only because causality run from per capita GDP to governance, but also because many 
governance structures are measured at the end of too close to the end of the growth period. In fact two way 
causality implies that the currently dominant good governance agenda suffers two way types of theoretical and 
development problems. The first blow is the assumption that causality entirely runs from governance to growth 
ignoring the important possibility that economic growth also changes governances. As rightly noted by Chang, 
(2010), economic growth changes governance through a number of ways, First, raised in wealth due to growth 
may generate greater needs for better quality of governances . Secondly, higher wealth equally, makes good 
governance more affordable, because institutions are costly public goods the greater their quality the more 
expensive they become. Thirdly, Economic growths generate new agents of change, demanding new governance 
institutions. Today most advance countries in the World posses these institutions  after, not before, their 
economic development, democracy, modern bureaucracy, banking regulation so forth, but compelling on poor 
countries to implement something no one has done at early stage of development. More specifically, the 
advance rich countries whose institution is stellar in international comparism did not have most of those good 
governance’s institutions in their early stage of development, it was after they become rich they acquired most 
of them. The regression causality through the use of measures of governance indicators may not be sufficient in 
helping us to identify the specific growth driving governance policies that can address institutional bindings’ 
constraints. Answer to this question requires going beyond the conventional wisdom of governance growth 
interaction, and explore a big historical lesson on how successful developers overcomes similar institutional 
constraints to Nigeria, taking a reference case study of somewhere in Asia or even earlier in Japan or even 
earlier in Europeans development. 
 
Conclusions: 
We try to examine the causal linkage between governance and poverty reduction in Nigeria, by exploring 
whether good governance causes growth or alternatively poverty reduction causes governance in Nigeria, the 
issues of causality has been the area of general controversy in the governance poverty discourse, we employed 
ARDL approach to co integration in order to find out the direction of the relationships between governance and 
poverty reduction in s case study of Nigeria. The findings of our study suggested that good governance 
measures are too coarse to capture the nuances of governance poverty reduction in Nigeria, because governance 
measures are based on the implicit assumption of a model that only exist in the western rich countries, to 
understand the nuance of interaction between governance and poverty, context specific situation must be taking 
into consideration which includes, history environment and culture of a particular country local content. Our 
studies have important policy implication for Nigeria, the good governance capabilities require for poverty 
reduction must the one that can drive growth in the short and medium term 
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